The Public Health Response and Epidemiologic Investigation Related to the Opening of a Bacillus anthracis–Containing Envelope, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C. by Hsu, Vincent P. et al.
Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1039
BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
Opening a Bacillus anthracis–
Containing Envelope, Capitol 
Hill, Washington, D.C.: The 
Public Health Response 
Vincent P. Hsu,* Susan L. Lukacs,* Thomas Handzel,* James Hayslett,* Scott Harper,* 
Thomas Hales,* Vera A. Semenova,* Sandra Romero-Steiner,* Cheryl Elie,* Conrad P. 
Quinn,* Rima Khabbaz,* Ali S. Khan,* Gregory Martin,† John Eisold,‡  Anne Schuchat,* 
and Rana A. Hajjeh*
On October 15, 2001, a U.S. Senate staff member opened an envelope containing Bacillus anthracis
spores. Chemoprophylaxis was promptly initiated and nasal swabs obtained for all persons in the immedi-
ate area. An epidemiologic investigation was conducted to define exposure areas and identify persons
who should receive prolonged chemoprophylaxis, based on their exposure risk. Persons immediately
exposed to B. anthracis spores were interviewed; records were reviewed to identify additional persons in
this area. Persons with positive nasal swabs had repeat swabs and serial serologic evaluation to measure
antibodies to B. anthracis protective antigen (anti-PA). A total of 625 persons were identified as requiring
prolonged chemoprophylaxis; 28 had positive nasal swabs. Repeat nasal swabs were negative at 7 days;
none had developed anti-PA antibodies by 42 days after exposure. Early nasal swab testing is a useful
epidemiologic tool to assess risk of exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis. Early, wide chemoprophylaxis
may have averted an outbreak of anthrax in this population. 
n the fall of 2001, a series of envelopes containing Bacillus
anthracis spores were sent via the U.S. Postal Service
(USPS) to cities in Florida and New York. Consequently,
many persons, including staff on Capitol Hill, received train-
ing on how to respond to suspicious envelopes that might con-
tain B. anthracis spores. This training was based on previously
prepared recommendations for a comprehensive response to
biological attacks using B. anthracis (1–3). On October 15,
2001, an envelope addressed to Senator Tom Daschle contain-
ing B. anthracis spores was opened by one of his staff mem-
bers. While the bioterrorism events in Florida and New York
came to the attention of public health authorities only when
persons were diagnosed (4–7) with anthrax, the event on Capi-
tol Hill was different—the presence of B. anthracis spores was
suspected immediately, allowing appropriate response and
prompt initiation of chemoprophylaxis in exposed persons. A
known source of exposure allowed a rapid epidemiologic
investigation, using nasal swab cultures for B. anthracis, envi-
ronmental sampling, and serologic testing. Although previous
epidemiologic studies have used nasal swabs and serologic
tests to assess B. anthracis exposure and subclinical (asymp-
tomatic) infection in endemic and outbreak settings (8–11), the
usefulness of these tools in the context of a bioterrorism event
is not known.
We describe here the initial public health response to the
opening of the contaminated envelope on Capitol Hill and the
epidemiologic methods used to determine the exposed area
and the population at risk for developing anthrax. While the
public health response later included the letter traceback
through the entire postal system, including identification and
prophylaxis of at-risk USPS employees (12), we limit our dis-
cussion to Capitol Hill. The results and epidemiologic impor-
tance of environmental sampling for B. anthracis, although
briefly mentioned, will be the focus of a separate paper.
Timeline of Events
On October 15, 2001, at 9:45 a.m., a staff member on the
6th floor of the Hart Senate Office Building (HSOB) in the
office of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle cut open a
taped business envelope containing a letter and a powdery sub-
stance (Table 1). Upon noticing a burst of dust, she placed the
letter on the floor and notified the U.S. Capitol Police. Within
5 minutes of being notified, officers were at the scene. The
hazardous device unit of the Capitol Police arrived minutes
later. The officers and emergency response personnel, referred
to as first responders, arrived with respiratory personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) on hand, but equipment was not put on
until after arrival at the scene. These officers tested the powder
for B. anthracis spores twice, using commercial rapid tests.
Preliminary results obtained within 15 minutes suggested that
the powder contained B. anthracis. Laboratories at the U.S.
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(USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland, later confirmed these
preliminary results.
At approximately 10:30 a.m., the ventilation system was
shut off. Medical staff from the Office of the Attending Physi-
cian (OAP), U.S. Capitol, began collecting nasal swabs for B.
anthracis culture from staff members in Senator Daschle’s
office, from staff in an adjacent office belonging to Senator
Russell Feingold, and from the first responders; in addition, an
initial 3-day antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis regimen
consisting of ciprofloxacin, 500 mg twice a day, was given to
these persons. Only the person who opened the contaminated
envelope removed and changed her clothing and was decon-
taminated with soap and water. All others washed their hands
with soap and water.
Next, first responders led employees from the two 6th-
floor offices to the 9th floor of the building, where further
samples were taken from nares and clothing. After testing,
these employees were led back to Senator Daschle’s 5th-floor
office, where other staff members were detained. At approxi-
mately 3:00 p.m., the staff members were allowed to go home.
Employees in other offices continued working until the
close of business. The southwest quadrant of the building was
closed the morning of October 16, and a decision was made to
close the entire HSOB that evening. During the next 3 days,
OAP continued to collect nasal swabs for B. anthracis for all
HSOB employees present on October 15 and for others on
Capitol Hill who requested these tests. OAP also gave those
tested an initial 3-day antimicrobial prophylaxis, pending final
confirmation of the presence of B. anthracis spores and results
of the epidemiologic investigation.
Methods
A team from the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) arrived in Washington D.C., on the morning of
October 16 to begin the epidemiologic investigation. To iden-
tify the group of persons who needed prolonged antimicrobial
prophylaxis on the basis of likely exposure to B. anthracis
spores, we sought to define an exposure area of higher risk.
To identify other facilities that may have been contami-
nated with B. anthracis spores, the contaminated envelope was
traced back through the congressional mail distribution system
before its arrival in Senator Daschle’s office. To define the
exposure area for HSOB, we obtained floor diagrams for the
5th and 6th floors and information about the ventilation system
from the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, which main-
tains and operates the U.S. Capitol complex. Multiple environ-
mental samples were taken from these facilities by a variety of
techniques (13).
The population at risk of developing anthrax was defined
as persons in the exposed area during or after the time the con-
taminated envelope was processed or opened. To identify each
person who may have been within the exposure area,
employee lists were obtained from staff managers for each
affected facility; in HSOB, managers for individual senators’
offices within the defined exposure area were contacted to
obtain employee and visitor lists. We identified responders
within HSOB, such as law enforcement and medical person-
nel, by contacting supervisors for a comprehensive list of
those who were in the area. To identify other visitors or non-
employees, press conferences were used to relay the appropri-
ate information. 
Within 9 hours of the initial event, nasal swab specimens
were collected for all persons in Senator Daschle’s and Senator
Feingold’s offices and for all first responders. As mentioned
earlier, further specimens were collected by OAP, for 4 days
after the opening of the contaminated envelope, from employ-
ees of HSOB and others on Capitol Hill. Specimens were col-
lected with Dacron fiber-tipped sterile swabs and sent for B.
anthracis culture at the National Naval Medical Center in
Bethesda, Maryland. Persons with initial positive nasal swabs
for B. anthracis had repeat nasal swabs at 7 days postexposure
and were administered a questionnaire about symptoms con-
sistent with anthrax disease. In addition, serum specimens
were obtained from these persons and tested at the CDC Men-
ingitis and Special Pathogens Laboratory for the presence of
immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibodies to B. anthracis protective
antigen (anti-PA) at 7, 21, and 42 days postexposure.
In collaboration with OAP, efforts were made to ensure
that all exposed persons were contacted and that they received
appropriate prophylaxis with ciprofloxacin, or in the cases of
persons unable to tolerate a quinolone, with doxycyline. OAP
closely monitored persons who came to the clinic with respira-
tory symptoms; follow-up surveys were later conducted on
persons receiving long-term antibiotic prophylaxis.
Results
Defining the Exposure Area and Population at Risk
Within Capitol Hill, the traceback of the contaminated
envelope before its arrival in Senator Daschle’s office showed
that it had been screened through a mail facility on P Street
and then through the Senate nonpublic mailroom, located in
the Dirksen Senate Office Building (Table 2). Nasal swabs for
Table 1. Timeline of events within the Hart Senate Office Building, 
Washington, D.C., October 15, 2001a
Time of day Event /response
9:45 a.m. Staff person opens letter containing Bacillus 
anthracis spores.
9:55 First responders arrive at scene.
10:00 Hazardous device unit arrives at scene and performs 
initial tests for B. anthracis.
10:15 First rapid test is positive for B. anthracis.
10:30 Ventilation system turned off. Second rapid test is 
positive. OAP begins nasal swab testing and antibiotic 
chemoprophylaxis distribution.
10:40 6th floor staff moved to 9th floor; swabbing continues; 
staff later moved to 5th floor.
3:00 p.m. Senators Daschle and Feingold’s staff allowed to go home.
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B. anthracis in employees of both mail facilities were nega-
tive; however, since exposure to B. anthracis spores may have
occurred during mail handling of the contaminated letter, the
Dirksen mailroom and the entire P Street facility, which was
an open warehouse, were defined as exposed areas. Addition-
ally, positive environmental samples for B. anthracis were
found in the mailroom in the Ford House Office Building,
where mail to the House of Representatives is processed.
Although the contaminated envelope did not pass through the
Ford Building mailroom, the potential of aerosolization of
spores from processing equipment, as well as the possibility of
an additional contaminated envelope, warranted its designa-
tion as an exposed area.
Senator Daschle’s suite is located on the 5th and 6th floors
of the southeast quadrant, with an open internal staircase join-
ing the floors. An adjacent suite occupied by staff of Senator
Feingold has a similar layout. Both adjacent offices share a
common hallway that serves as the main entry to the 6th-floor
office, but no door connects the Daschle and Feingold suites.
A single ventilation system supplies and exhausts air for the
nine floors in the southeast quadrant, independently of other
areas in the building.
In HSOB, where the primary release of B. anthracis spores
occurred, all persons with nasal cultures positive for B. anthra-
cis were clustered in and around Senator Daschle’s office and
were located on either the 5th or 6th floor (see below). Prelim-
inary environmental sampling results were positive for B.
anthracis spores from within the same rooms occupied by per-
sons with positive nasal cultures. The location of the contami-
nated office was within the shared ventilation space of the
southeast quadrant of the building. The exposure area in
HSOB was thus defined as the southeast quadrant of the 5th
and 6th floors. Within these four designated exposure areas
(5th- and 6th-floor southeast quadrant, P Street facility, and the
Dirksen and Ford Building mailrooms), 625 persons were
identified as employees, visitors, or otherwise being within the
exposed areas (Table 2). More than 2,000 persons received an
initial 3-day course of antibiotics, but only the 625 persons
from the defined exposure areas were recommended to receive
60 days of chemoprophylaxis.
Nasal Swabs Results
OAP obtained nasal swabs for B. anthracis culture from
2,172 persons during October 15–October 18, including the
625 persons identified at risk. Of these, 71 were known to be
in the immediate exposure area within the first hour of the
event in which the contaminated envelope was opened (Table
3); 65 were Senate staff, and 6 were first responders. A total of
28 persons had positive nasal cultures for B. anthracis; all pos-
itive results were from specimens obtained on October 15
between 10:30 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. The median age of these
persons was 27 years (range 21–57). All persons positive for
B. anthracis entered either Senator Daschle’s or Senator Fein-
gold’s suites, with the exception of one responder who was in
the hallway adjacent to Senator Daschle’s office on the 6th
floor but did not enter either suite. All 18 persons (including 5
first responders) in Senator Daschle’s 6th-floor suite had posi-
tive nasal cultures; a much lower proportion had positive nasal
swabs on the 5th-floor Daschle suite (28%) and 6th-floor Fein-
gold suite (13%).
Repeat nasal swabs from the 28 persons with initially posi-
tive nasal cultures for B. anthracis were negative for all per-
sons at 7 days postexposure. Serologic tests were negative for
anti-PA IgG antibodies in all persons at 7, 21, and 42 days
after exposure. To date, anthrax has not developed in anyone
in this cohort or in the larger cohort of persons on Capitol Hill.
Discussion
Among the series of bioterrorism incidents during 2001
related to B. anthracis–contaminated envelopes, this event was
unique because it was the first with a known source of expo-
sure, enabling a rapid public health response by a multidisci-
plinary team including law enforcement officers, medical and
public health personnel, laboratory personnel, industrial
hygienists, and engineers. The known source enabled us to
assess the usefulness of nasal swab cultures in determining
exposure to B. anthracis.
The contaminated letter purportedly contained about 2 g of
powder, with each gram reported to contain between 100 bil-
lion to 1 trillion spores (14). The recovery of B. anthracis from
nasal cultures was limited to persons who were inside Senator
Daschle or Feingold’s offices or in the hallway joining the two
offices. Nasal swab results suggest that the ventilation system
Table 2. Defined exposure areas and identification of persons at risk 
from Bacillus anthracis–containing envelope, Washington, D.C.
Defined exposure area
Environmental 
samples positive?
No. persons 
identified at risk
No. positive 
nasal swabs
SE quadrant, 5th and 
6th floors, Hart Senate 
Office Building
Yes 442 28
P Street mail-process-
ing facility
Yes 62 0
Mailroom, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building
Yes 40 0
Mailroom, Ford House 
Office Building
Yes 81 0
Totals 625 28
Table 3. Proportion of persons with positive nasal swabs for Bacillus 
anthracis in the immediate exposure area, by office and floor,a Capitol 
Hill, Washington, D.C.
Floor Senate office Persons in area Positive nasal swabs (% positive)
6 Daschle 18 18 (100)
Feingold 15 2 (13)
5 Daschle 25 7 (28)
Feingold 12 0 (0)
Total 70 27 (39)
aOne responder with a positive nasal swab who was in the 6th-floor hallway did not 
enter the Daschle or Feingold suites and was not included in this table.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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played a very small role, if any, in the spread of anthrax spores
in HSOB. Based on proportions of persons with positive nasal
swabs, most dissemination likely occurred through room cur-
rents from the 6th to the 5th floor of the Daschle suite via an
open staircase; closed doors that blocked air currents were
most likely the reason a smaller proportion in Senator Fein-
gold’s office had positive nasal cultures despite being adjacent
to Senator Daschle’s office.
Swabs were taken within 1 day of the initial event from all
71 persons in the immediate exposure area, including those
with positive nasal cultures for B. anthracis. However, in oth-
ers with negative results, testing was not done for up to 4 days.
Although these persons were located outside the immediate
exposure area, it is uncertain whether prompt antibiotic admin-
istration, a delay in nasal swab testing, or both, may have had
an effect on those nasal culture results. In one animal model
involving macaques, large inhaled doses of anthrax spores in a
controlled setting yielded B. anthracis in nasal swabs of all
animals within 24 hours of exposure, and although sensitivity
decreased as time progressed, positive nasal cultures were
recovered in some macaques 1 week after exposure (15). In
the Florida anthrax investigation, positive nasal cultures were
detected in a person >1 week after presumed exposure (5).
Repeat swabs from the persons with initially positive cultures
were negative at 7 days postexposure, but prophylaxis admin-
istration may have influenced those results. The greatest sensi-
tivity for recovery of B. anthracis can be achieved by
obtaining nasal swab specimens as early as possible after rec-
ognized exposure.
Nasal swabs served as an epidemiologic tool; we consid-
ered the work locations of those with positive nasal swabs to
be areas at risk for anthrax exposure. However, interpretation
of positive or negative nasal swab results for individual risk
assessment of anthrax disease has not been evaluated, and
nasal swabs should not be used for this purpose. In the case of
one person who died after exposure to anthrax, a nasal swab
culture was negative (16). Likewise, environmental sampling
may be a valuable component of assessment of areas of risk,
but individual environmental samples are not sufficient to
determine a person's risk for anthrax.
Two other issues deserve mention. First, the use of PPE
may be an effective barrier to exposure to B. anthracis spores,
although its efficacy could not be addressed in this investiga-
tion; no responder entering Senator Daschle’s office wore PPE
before entering the office, and all had positive nasal swabs.
Second, while subclinical anthrax infection has been docu-
mented in persons with continuous exposure to B. anthracis
spores (9), the lack of serologic conversion in persons with
positive nasal cultures suggests that no apparent asymptomatic
infection occurred during this event, when prophylaxis was
promptly initiated and continued.
Since the initial events of October 15, more information
has become available—four cases of inhalational anthrax, two
of them fatal, occurred in USPS employees from the Washing-
ton, D.C., Postal Distribution Center where Senator Daschle’s
envelope was sorted (7,12,16), and a fifth case occurred in an
employee of another mail facility, which receives government
mail from the Washington, D.C., Distribution Center. These
events led to new recommendations to expand the traceback
for future events through the entire path to envelope origin. In
addition, updated prophylaxis and treatment protocols, includ-
ing options for vaccination, and subsequent recommendations
for a comprehensive response to a bioterrorism attack involv-
ing B. anthracis have been published (17–21). In Table 4, spe-
cific recommendations are given for a comprehensive public
health response and epidemiologic investigation that prevent
further spread, identify and treat those at risk, and avoid mass
administration of prolonged prophylaxis to persons not consid-
ered at risk for anthrax in the event of a future bioterrorist
attack.
In conclusion, a rapid and coordinated public health
response helped avert an anthrax outbreak by identifying and
administering prophylaxis to persons at high risk for disease.
Nasal swabs can provide useful information about the extent
of exposure to B. anthracis spores to assist with defining
groups at risk.
Epidemiologic assessment of risk for anthrax in persons in
settings affected by a biological attack is complex, and much
remains to be learned. In the meantime, a well-developed pub-
lic health infrastructure, effective antimicrobial prophylaxis
strategies, and effective guidelines for management based on
past experiences are essential in our defense against future bio-
terrorism events.
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